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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this appeal properly lies in the Utah
Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h)(Supp.
1986) .

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is a civil, non-domestic lawsuit arising out of
the termination of Gilmore's employment with the Salt Lake
Area Community Action Program.

It was instituted in the

Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County.
Honorable Judge Homer Wilkinson presided.

The

On June 26,

1987, the Court granted the Respondents1 Motion for
Summary Judgment and entered its Order dismissing
Gilmore's Complaint in its entirety.
Gilmore is appealing this Summary Judgment only as it
pertains to his first and second causes of action which
are for breach of an employment contract.
Appellant/Plaintiff, p. 4.

Brief of

The appeal was originally

taken to the Utah Supreme Court.

It was then poured over

to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition.
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Gilmorefs employment was at will,

2.

Whether the Personnel Policies Manual conferred

any contractual rights upon Gilmore.
3.

Whether Respondents breached the employment

contract.
4.

Whether the Respondents, other than the Salt Lake

Area Community Action Program, are personally liable for
breach of the employment contract.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is a civil, non-domestic dispute arising
out of the termination of Gilmore1s employment with the
Salt Lake Community Action Program.

It was first

instituted on April 25, 1979, in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division.
Walter K. Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action
Program, et al., #C-79-0258.

On December 30, 1980, that

Court granted Defendants1 motion for summary judgment,
dismissing that action on its merits with prejudice, on
the grounds that there was no federal jurisdiction.
Gilmore appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit.

In the decision, Gilmore v. SaJt Lake
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Area Community Action Program, 710 F.2d 632 (1983), the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court judgment and
entered the judgment on April 18, 1983.

He petitioned for

a rehearing which was denied on July 27, 1983.

Id.

On July 23, 1984, Gilmore instituted this lawsuit in
the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County.
Record at 2 (hereafter abbreviated " R . " ) .

The Court

ordered, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, that the
depositions and other discovery taken in the previous
Federal Court action be filed and published in this
action.

Once published, Gilmore and Respondents filed

cross motions for summary judgment.

R. at 52 & 101.

At the hearing on the summary judgment motions the
parties stipulated that Gilmore's sixth, seventh, eighth
and ninth causes of action would be dismissed with
prejudice.

R. at 547-549.

The Court then granted

Respondents' motion as to all of the remaining causes of
action, thereby dismissing Gilmore's Complaint in its
entirety, with prejudice.

R. at 545 & 547-549.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS.
A.

Background.

The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program,
(hereafter referred to as S.L.C.A.P.) is a private,
non-profit corporation organized under the laws of the
State of Utah.

R. at 2 & 24.

State program or entity.

It is not a Federal or

Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area

Community Action Program, 710 F.2d 632.

It was organized

"to establish, operate and coordinate community action
programs in order to prevent and alleviate poverty and its
causes, and to cooperate with other organizations, and to
secure and expend monies for these purposes."

R. at 150.

For instance, S.L.C.A.P. performs numerous neighborhood
programs including the administration in whole or in part
for the Community Food and Nutrition Program, Head Start,
Day Care, Handicap Head Start, Weatherization, Energy
Crisis Assistance Program and others.

Parara Deposition

at 72-83.
S.L.C.A.P. funds these programs by qualifying for
various grants and contracts.
12-13.

Schultz Deposition at

One major grant comes from a federal agency, the

Community Services Administration.
at 10-15.

Vanderburgh Deposition

S.L.C.A.P. qualifies for this grant by

conforming to Community Services Administration
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Instructions.

Id. at 29; 45 C.F.R. 1060-1070 (repealed

1981). In so doing, S.L.C.A.P. adopted a personnel
policies manual in 1972 to conform with these
instructions.

Schultz Deposition at 9 & Ex. P-l.

This

manual was in effect at all times material to this action.
R. at 5 & 54.
S.L.C.A.P. is controlled by a Board of Trustees.
at 153; Philbrick Deposition at 12.

R.

The Board is

composed of local officials, representatives of the poor,
business, and labor.

R. at 152. The Board's President is

the Defendant Robert E. Philbrick.
Deposition at 5.

R. at 3; Philbrick

He succeeded the Defendant Ann O'Connell

who was president at the time the employee, Walter
Gilmore, was discharged from employment.

R. at 3.

The Board of Trustees delegates its authority for the
day-to-day operations of S.L.C.A.P. to the Executive
Director, Defendant Hal J. Schultz.

R. at 151. He has

authority for all personnel decisions, including the
authority to reduce in force employees as he deems fit.
R. at 153; Philbrick Deposition at 15.
are, however, subject to review
Committee.

His decisions

by the Personnel

R. at 156; Schultz Deposition at 9 & Ex. P-].

The Personnel Committee is comprised of three members
elected by the Board of Trustees.
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R. at 150 & 156. Its

membership is limited to three of the Board of Trustees1
Members.

Id.

B. Facts Relating to Gilmore's Contract of
Employment.
Gilmore first interviewed for a temporary accounting
position with S.L.C.A.P. on March 5, 1974. Gilmore
Deposition at 5 & 7-8.

In that interview salary was

discussed and he was told that the job "was a temporary
position,that it would last probably three months."
at 7-9; R. at 53.

Id.

Gilmore does not remember that any

documents were provided him.

Gilmore Deposition at 9.

He

does not recall anything else about the interview "except
that it was just the - - I'm sure it was a rather typical
question and answer type of interview.

He asked me about

my experience and qualifications and I'm sure the usual
type of inquiries."

.Id. at 8.

He was hired for the

position the following day, March 6, 1974.

R. at 3 6c 53.

Gilmore worked in this temporary position for six
months.

R. at 3.

During this time he did not have any

conversations with anyone of a supervisory nature
concerning the terms of his employment, "Not beyond what I
had already understood, as I remember."

Gilmore

Deposition at 9.
On about September 6, 1974, the position of Fiscal
Director became available.

Id. at 10. The Executive
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Director, Hal J. Schultz, was the immediate supervisor
over this position and responsible for staffing it.
2 & 151.

R. at

Gilmore asked the Executive Director to consider

him for the position.

Gilmore Deposition at 10.

The

Executive Director checked Gilmore1s qualifications and on
September 9, 1974, he was promoted to the position.
at 11-12, R. at 3 & 53.

Id.

Gilmore does not remember any

other terms or conditions of his employment discussed at
that time other than that he was subject to a six month
probationary period.

Gilmore Deposition at 12-13.

He

also does not remember any documents provided him in
reference to the terms and conditions of his employment.
16.

at 13.
Sometime soon after September 9, 1974, Gilmore was

supplied with a copy of the Personnel Policies Manual.
Gilmore Deposition at 18.
and kept it there.

I_d.

He obtained a copy for his desk

He does not recall how he

obtained it, who gave it to him or having any
conversations with anyone about it at that time.

_Id. at

18 & 19.
One conversation took place with the Executive
Director in terms of Gilmore's responsibilities as fiscal
director towards the company and the staff.

id. at 19-21.

But Gilmore does not know how, when or where the
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conversation took place.

He recalls being told, "that the

regulations in it would apply.

Those, so far as they

would apply, I would be expected to follow them in my
position as employee as well as supervisor."
20.

Id.

at 17 &

He does not remember any other conversations with

anyone else at S.L.C.A.P. relative to his employment
through March, 1975.

Id.

at 22.

The Executive Director maintained a policy of
advising persons who were hired that the Manual existed.
But he did not personally advise each employee.

Schultz

Deposition at 16. Gilmore admits, however, that his
employment with S.L.C.A.P. contained no specified definite
period of time for employment.
C.

R. at 117, 575 & 581.

Facts Relative to Gilmore's Termination.

Sometime during 1976 federal officials indicated that
Gilmore was having difficulty in the record keeping and
reporting.

Gilmore Deposition at 87 - 88. They also

reported that S.L.C.A.P.fs accounting systems and
procedures were cumbersome and outdated.

Schultz

This fact is an admission made by Gilmore in
response to Respondents1 Request For Admissions. R. at
575 & 581. This admission is reproduced verbatim in the
addendum herein, p. 5 & 1J.
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Deposition at 99 - 100. An audit was performed for the
fiscal year ending March 31, 1976.

Gilmore's accounting

reflected a deficit for that period of $1,800.00. The
audit established that the deficit was $9,800.00.
151; Gilmore Deposition at 81-82.

Id. at

The auditors declared

that fiscal period inauditable as well as the entire
period

Gilmore was Fiscal Director.

Gilmore Deposition

at 84-85.
The decision was made in May or June, 1976 to
computerize the Fiscal Department.
Schultz Deposition at 99-100.
computer skills.

Ld. at 86 & 89;

However, Gilmore held no

Gilmore Deposition at 28.

S.L.C.A.P.

retained the firm, Bunker and Bunker, Certified Public
Accountants, to assist Gilmore in this process.

Icl. at

89; Schultz Deposition at 100 & 126.

The computerization

process was to proceed without delay.

The general ledger

was top priority, followed by the payroll.
101-102; Gilmore Deposition at 89.
had to be reconstructed.

Ld. at

But Gilmore's accounts

It took six months to place the

payroll into the computer.

Gilmore Deposition at 89-90.

During the fall of 1976, the federal officials
continued to complain about how Gilmore's department was
handling S.L.C.A.P. ! s affairs.

Icl- at 94-96.

Both the

Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the
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Community Services Administration indicated their desire
for accurate accounting.

Id.

It was during this time, on September 27, 1976, that
the Executive Director began a written evaluation on
Gilmore's job performance.
Exhibit P-2.

Schultz Deposition at 23 &

This was the only written evaluation he

attempted to make on Gilmore.
complete or sign it.
P-2.

R. at 11. He did not

Schultz Deposition at 23 & Exhibit

In October, 1976, he discovered vast discrepancies

in Gilmore's work.

ld_. at 124 & 125. While the audit for

the year ending March 31, 1976, established a $9,800.00
deficit, in October, the Executive Director discovered an
additional $16,000.00 variance in the reports prepared for
him and the reports prepared for the Community Services
Administration 16. at 124.

The actual deficit was finally

established at $46,362.00.

Ld. at 90 & Ex. D-.L2.

The Executive Director showed "understandable concern
for the problems that the accounting department was
having."

Gilmore Deposition at 99.

As a result he held

several meetings with Gilmore prior to his discharge.
Within the two years prior to discharge the Executive
Director met with him on four or five occasions about
specific problems with his department and the need to
computerize it.

Ld. at 90, 101-102 & Ex. D-12.

Finally,

the Executive Director met with Gilmore in October and
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November or December, 1976, and indicated that Gilmorefs
job was in jeopardy if the deficencies were not corrected.
Ld. at 95-96.
On December 15, 1976, the Executive Director reported
specifically to the Board of Trustees a plan to reduce the
large deficit.

Ld*

at

90 & Ex. D-12.

during the discussion of this plan.

Gilmore was present
Icl. The Executive

Director proposed a reduction in the fiscal staff, and to
obtain contract accounting.

_Id. The idea was to contract

the accounting out to a professional firm and have
Gilmore remain as Office Manager.
128.

Schultz Deposition at

However, the Board turned the plan down.

Id.

The Executive Director had no choice but to establish
a different plan.

Id.

at 129.

About February, 1977, in a

meeting between the Executive Director, Gilmore and Mr.
Johnson, the Executive Director examined Gilmore on his
ability to submit properly a report to the Regional
Office, and indicated, again, that his job was in jeopardy
due to the deficiencies in the performance of his
responsibilities.

Id.

at J00-101 & 111.

Finally, in March, 1977, the Executive Director
completely reorganized the Fiscal Department.
Deposition at 129.

Schultz

The substantive reorganization was:

I hired an accounting supervisor with specified
computer accounting background and reduced the force,
terminating Mr. Gilmore, and 1 took over all the
-11-

policy type functions of the fiscal director and
ordered the computer specialist to get our accounts
straightened out and into a computer. _IcL at
129-130.
The Executive Director eliminated the position of Fiscal
Director and assumed the fiscal policy making duties
himself.

Id.

at 130. Gilmore was reduced in force rather

than being fired.

_Id. at 131. This was because the

Executive Director believed that Gilmore needed
unemployment compensation and needed to find other
employment.

Id.

He notified Gilmore of his termination

in a meeting the first part of March, 1977. Gilmore
Deposition at 104. This meeting lasted the better part of
an hour.

I_d. at Vol. II p. 16.

One to three days later, Gilmore called the Executive
Director at his home and "told him that I would like a
chance to meet with him and discuss the situation to see
if possibly I could prevail upon him to change his mind."
Id. at 108. The Executive Director agreed to hear him.
Id.

Gilmore describes the meeting as follows:
It was a series of refutations, refuting of my
efforts to defend myself as to my performance during
the time I had been employed and efforts to suggest
some kind of alleviating measures that could be taken
without it, meaning my termination. ... The substance
of what I said was to dissuade Mr. Schultz from his
decision and to persuade him if possible, that there
would be a better way to solve the problem for the
agency and certainly for me than to fire me. I do
not remember the words I used to bring that about,
but that was about the extent of what I said. ... Id.
at 109-110.
-12-

He describes what the Executive Director said as follows:
The substance of what he said was that it was too
late; there was no way now that I could save myself
or salvage my job, that he was committed, he'd made
statements to people, he was committed that my
termination was to be made. And then he began to
recite a number of instances, one of which 1 have
mentioned about the false report. ... And Mr. SchuJtz
questioned me on my ability to submit properly a
form, a report to the regional office ... that I was
huffy in the meeting that we had and the conversation
that we had between him and myself and Mr. Johnson.
Another thing that was brought up was a little
argument I had with an employee, a man named Del
Barker. ... Mr. Schultz's issue was that 1 had caused
a disturbance and was argumentative with Mr. Barker
over his paycheck ... Yes, a number of others, and I
don't recall them right now. ... And, my
responsibility for Jerry Murray, that this would be
another very serious transgression on my part. Id.
at 111-115.
In both of these meetings Gilmore was not prevented from
demonstrating why he should not be terminated.

He was not

limited in terms of being able to bring up those instances
he felt justified his retention.

Ld. at Vol. II p. 6 & 17.

On March 14, 1977, Gilmore was notified in writing of
his reduction in force.

R. at 4 & 82.

He was also

provided a Utah Department of Employment Security
Separation Notice citing the reason for termination as
"reduction in force".

R. at 4, 54 & 84.

The March 14,

1977, notification provided two weeks pay in J Leu of
notice.

Gilmore Deposition at Vol. II p. 9, 18, Ex. D-15

& D-17.
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On March 15, 1971,

Gilmore wrote the Executive

Director appealing his discharge.
March 16, 1971,

R. at 6, 55 & 83. On

the Executive Director wrote Gilmore

stating that he considered the second meeting in March to
constitute his appeal to the Executive Director and that
Gilmore had a right to appeal to the Personnel Committee.
R. at 6 & 55.
Gilmore then appealed to the Personnel Committee. A
hearing was scheduled on March 16, 1977.
members of the Committee were present.

R. at 7.

Two

The format of the

hearing was described in advance to Gilmore that he "would
make a statement, that it would be taped on a tape
recorder, and that when my statement was finished, that I
wouJd be excused and Mr. Schultz would be called in to
make a statement on the tape recorder."

R. at 7 & 55-56;

Gilmore Deposition at Vol. II p. 29-31.

It was also

determined at the beginning of the meeting that there
would not be time to complete it until the following week.
Id.

Gilmore had no objection to this format,

^d. at 31.

He then began making his statement into the recorder.
Executive Director was not present.

The

R. at 7 & 56.

The hearing was continued to March 21, 1977.

Id.

The Committee's three members were present while Gilmore
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finished making his statement into the recorder*
& 56.

He was then excused and the Executive Director was

invited in to make his statement.

Gilmore was not present

during the Executive Director's presentation.
56.

R. at 7

R. at 7 &

The Committee decided to have them give statements

out of each other's presence because it believed it would
be more fair not to have Gilmore's immediate supervisor
present, "so Mr. Gilmore would feel free to speak his
mind."

Geter Deposition at 29.

Gilmore admits that there was no evidence refused by
the Committee that was offered by him.
at Vol. II p. 33.

Gilmore Deposition

The Committee never r at any time,

refused to allow him to do something he requested to do.
Id. at 158.

He admits he never requested that the

Executive Director be present.

16.

at Vol. II, p. 29.

Nor did he request to confront or cross-examine him at any
time.

_Id.

Gilmore further admits he never requested the

right to challenge or disqualify any member of the
2
Personnel Committee. R. at 575 & 581.
He never
requested that the decision of the Personnel Committee be
3
based solely upon evidence adduced at the hearing. Id.
Td.
-15-

He never requested a written decision of the Personnel
Committee stating reasons for its decision. ld_. 4 He
never requested that any verbatim record be made.
He never requested counsel.

Id.

5

Gilmore Deposition at 158.

All of the witnesses testified that Gilmore was
afforded the same rights as was the Salt Lake Area
Community Action Program.

Geter Deposition at 13. The

Personnel Committee Chairman testified that the Personnel
Committee was not biased and was fair.

1^3. The decision

of the Committee was based upon the evidence presented.
Id. at 27. Both Gilmore and the Executive Director wrote
statements in support of their position.

Ij3. at 42-44 &

48.
On about April 1, 1977, the Personnel Committee
Chairman told Gilmore that he had not been able to arrange
for the members to meet to reach a final decision.
8.

R. at

Gilmore was also notified that the Committee was not

able to reach its decision in five days after the
conclusion of the hearing due to the many pieces of
evidence and legal ramifications.
166.

Gilmore Deposition at

He did not object to this or make any statements to

any member of the Committee or anyone else that they
couldn't do that because it would take longer than five
days.

]j3. at 166-167.

i Id.
Id.
-16-

On April 13, 1977, the Chairman of the Personnel
Committee, Fred Geter, wrote to Gilmore and informed him
that it " . . . upholds the decision of Hal Schultz in
your reduction of force and reorganization of the Fiscal
Department."

Gilmore Deposition at 5-6 & Ex. D-14.

decision of the Personnel Committee was final.

The

Ld. at 52.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THE BREACH
OF CONTRACT CLAIMS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE
GILMOREfS EMPLOYMENT WAS AT WILL.

Gilmore admits that his employment with S.L.C.A.P.
was for an indefinite period of time.

He has not set

forth any facts or presented any argument that his
employment falls within an exception to the employment
at-will doctrine.

As a result, under the cases Bruno v.

Plateau Mining Co., 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 89 (Utah Ct. App.
1987), Rose v. Allied Development Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah
1986) and Bihlmaier v. Carsen, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979),
Gilmore was an at-will employee who could be terminated
for just cause or no cause, without recourse against his
employer for breach of the employment contract.
S.L.C.A.P.!s promulgation of a policy manual does not
constitute an implied contract of employment.

The manual

does not contain any terms concerning the duration of

-17-

Gilmore's employment.

In Bruno, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 89,

this Court flatly rejected other jurisdictions1 departures
from the employment at-will doctrine in order to imply an
employment contract from an employer's policies.
POINT II. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
BECAUSE S.L.C.A.P. COMPLIED WITH THE
PERSONNEL POLICIES.
Even if S.L.C.A.P.'s policies limited the right to
terminate Gilmore at will the law does not require strict
or literal compliance with its terms.

If S.L.C.A.P.

substantially complied with the terms of the contract so
as not to compromise the interests such terms were
designed to safeguard, then it is not guilty of breach of
the contract.

Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College,

636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981).
In this case, S.L.C.A.P. substantially complied with
the policies, and each of the interests the policies were
designed to safeguard were satisfied or protected.

A

close examination of the facts shows that in some
instances S.L.C.A.P.fs slight deviations from the
procedures actually promoted or enhanced the interests
concerned.

Therefor, even if S.L.C.A.P.'s policies

limited the right to terminate Gilmore at-will, S.L.C.A.P.
is not guilty of a breach thereof.

-18-
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A. The Dismissal. Of The Breach Of Contract Claims
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employer may terminate the employee at will, for just
cause or no cause, without fear of liability.

Bruno v.

Plateau Mining Co., 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 89 (Utah Ct. App.
1987); Rose v. Allied Development Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah
1986); Bihlmaier v. Carsen, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979).
Inasmuch as the employment was at will, the employer did
not breach any contract and the trial court's summary
dismissal was proper.
The Bihlmaier case is dispositive of this issue.

In

that case the plaintiff, after extended negotiations, left
a job in California and accepted employment in Utah to
become the acting manager of a grocery store.

The

employer testified that plaintiff's employment was
conditioned upon his activities during a trial period.
Shortly after arriving in Utah the plaintiff tried to
purchase a house.

His loan application was refused when

the employer stated on the application, "continued
employment depends on applicant - hired on a trial basis
only."

Bihlmaier, 603 P.2d at 791. The plaintiff

considered the employer's refusal to change this statement
a constructive discharge and initiated a lawsuit for
breach of the employment contract.

The trial court

granted the employer's motion for summary judgment and the
plaintiff appealed.

Id.
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B• The Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme Court
Have Firmly Rejected Any Departures From the Employment At
Will Doctrine Based On An Employer's Policies.
In two recent cases, Bruno v. Plateau Mining Co., 73
Utah Adv. Rep. 89, and Rose v. Allied Development Co., 719
P.2d 83, the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of
Appeals reaffirmed the employment at-will doctrine as the
law of this State.

Gilmore asks this Court to disregard

this law on the ground that S.L.C.A.P.fs Personnel
Policies Manual is the employment contract.

In the Bruno

case the Utah Court of Appeals firmly rejected this
argument in favor of the at-will doctrine.

As a result,

the dismissal of the breach of contract claims was proper
and should be upheld.
In the Bruno case the employer maintained a de
facto personnel policy of imposing only temporary
suspension as the maximum penalty for employee fighting.
Bruno, nevertheless, was forced to resign for fighting in
the mine.

He filed a lawsuit against his employer for

wrongful discharge.

The undisputed evidence was that

Bruno was hired as an employee at-will.

Nevertheless, he

claimed that the employer's de facto personnel policy
created an implied employment contract which was breached
by his termination. The lower court granted the employer's
motion for summary judgment on the ground that Bruno's

-22-
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In this case, Gilmore is asking this Court to do
exactly what it refused to do in the Bruno case - that is,
depart from the employment at-will doctrine and recognize
an implicit contractual right based upon an employer's
unilateral promulgation of a policy manual.

This Court

has already rejected this major departure from Utah law
which Gilmore urges based on the cases Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, and
Forrester v. Parker, 606 P.2d 191 (N.M. 1980).
In Toussaint, the Michigan Supreme Court stated:

"We

hold that employer statements of policy, such as the Blue
Cross Supervisory Manual and Guidelines, can give rise to
contractual rights in employees without evidence that the
parties mutually agreed that the policy statements would
create contractual rights in the employee, . . . M.
(Emphasis added) Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892. The Court
of Appeals held in the Bruno case that this was not the
law in Utah and that an implied contract, altering the
at-will relationship, must be proven by acts or conduct
manifesting the mutual assent of both parties.
added).

(Emphasis

Bruno, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. at 90.

In Forrester, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
a personnel policy guide controlled the employment
relationship, holding:
-24-
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as other contracts. It did not recognize
^mnioyment as a fundamental right or create a
"special " r i ght. The only right held in
Toussaint to be enforceable was the right that
arose out of the promise not to terminate except
for cause.
Employers and employees remail I fr ee to provide,
or not to provide*, f or j ob secur i ty . Absent_a
contractual provision for job security, either
the employer or the employee may ordinarily
terminate an employment contract at any time for
any, or no, reason.
[Emphasi s added.]

recently

Valentine v. General American Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 256,
258-59, 362 N.W. 2d 628 (1984) (footnote omitted).

Thus

even the Michigan Supreme Court has rejected Gilmore's
argument that a personnel policy manual creates a new
employment right or exception to the at-will doctrine.
Moreover, the law in the majority of states which
have considered this question is that the promulgation of
a policy manual does not implicitly limit the right of an
employer to terminate at-will.

See, e.g. McConnell v.

Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 499 So.2d 68 (Fid. App. Ct.
1986); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge, Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328
N.E.2d 775 (1975); Heideck v. Kent General Hospital, Inc.,
446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); Reid v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. National Beef
Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); Schroeder
v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F.Supp. 910 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
C. The Dismissal Was Also Proper Because Under
Utah Law The Employer's Policies Do Not Constitute An
Express Or Implied Contract As To The Duration Of
Employment.
In both the Bruno and Rose cases, the Courts have
recognized only two limited exceptions to the employment
at-will doctrine.

These two exceptions are:

1) an

express or implied stipulation as to the duration of the
employment, or; 2) good consideration in addition to the
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relation to the terms and conditions of his employment.
Id. at 8-9 & 12-13.

After obtaining a copy of the

policies Gilmore was simply told that he was expected to
follow them in his position as employee and supervisor.
Id. at 17 & 20. He does not recall any other conversation
relative to the policies.

Icl. at 22. The Executive

Director maintained a policy of advising new employees
that the manual containing the policies existed, but he
did not advise each one.

Schultz Deposition at at 16.

This evidence does not alter the fact that Gilmore was
hired for an indefinite time.

The parties did not

expressly or implicitly stipulate that Gilmore was
employed for any specific period of time.

The trial Court

correctly applied the law in dismissing the breach of
contract claims.
In further support of his argument Gilmore relies on
two Utah cases, Moore v. Utah Technical College, 727 P.2d
634 (Utah 1986), and Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State
College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981).

He contends that

these cases stand for the proposition that personnel
policy manuals give rise to contractual rights and
obligations.

Actually, these cases fall within the first

exception to the employment at-will doctrine.

In each

case, the plaintiffs were hired under a one year contract.

-28-

whereupo"
•'

a

\ ; ^ "" d r

hrf

.'> T , I-

r<'v,
(

»"* i ;=» i r. t

'"P

del i n n c

1

will

*

* *-«oc:o ^ a s ^ s

Joctrine,

,J

-

oecause

1

i • ^ r }•

(

v.1 - S

» c. e

!"

i

1

\ - j

-* '°

r

i<'>

n

'

*

*

issue- o f

\ n*.

v.v_^

^i

h r

U'^
'

u

] j

n,

i

* r . ie .

<". ; ni r 'f P 1 -

siipn^'''

riaciiem ,

* each t h e

i:««_:

f i om i n«

d e m n n s ' i a 1 inc]

OX C O P + . i *^n

f

- ' .

ro j a t i cnsn i p

S t

i'i

i f f

wo * n*-^cj- i ] a • *. : .

*• >

* ho emp ! oymen t

•i*

< . >• ; i a c 1

. • «-•

a^qu^ent.

11 <*wnstaiK t?s u!i<:or

'""">'" t r i r j r

6PP

*'^ F .

• i

whether

'^* p e r s o n n e l

nav^c* :

appealed. Piacitelli , 6/6 \ 2o a* ] »-•
The Dismissal Was _ Proper Becau se Gil more Did Not
Provide Any Good Consideration In Addition To The Services
Contracted To Be Rendered.
As oreviously explains J, Lt,, v.:
exception

< - < .- -I ~

-1 :"J •

j

-. ---cr • -~

;<_• re,cleiC\:.

o the services contracted

Ad1-, t-^r

- ,^r rpco y . -.

f -^ • hf empiovmrn* at -w ' - 1 i o - * t * ; ne i- o^ _:

:
1

?

•. : .us-tanco,

i ' *

-29-

t;ru_D°^

i}

a d d i * '•"'
; 1

'

'he Rose c a s e , the Uf an

To satisfy the "good consideration"
exception of Bihlmaier, plaintiff would have had
to offer Allied, at its request, something more
than what he was already obligated to do under
his employment agreement, not just a
continuation of the duties he was required to
perform.
Neither the statements made by Wetsel nor
plaintiff's subjective understanding of those
statements is adequate justification to find an
implied contract or consideration sufficient to
fall within the exceptions recognized by this
Court. Rose, 719 P.2d at 86.
In this case, Gilmore has not set forth any facts that
support this exception to the employment at-will doctrine,
nor has he advanced any argument in this regard.

There

simply is not any evidence in this case that can justify a
finding of added consideration sufficient to fall within
this exception.

The personnel policies were always in

effect during Gilmorefs employment.

He simply continued

to perform his duties during his employment.

There is no

evidence that either party offered any new consideration
during his employment.

Inasmuch as this exception has no

application in this case, the summary judgment should be
affirmed.
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warning, 3) suspension, and 4) dismissal.

The manual made

clear that the purpose of this procedure was to prevent
major acts of misconduct by giving early warning of the
possible consequences for continued misconduct.

The

employer did not strictly comply with this procedure.
Instead, Piacitelli was advised in numerous oral
interviews of his unacceptable conduct, the specific
deficiencies in his performance and that his job
was in jeopardy.

The Utah Supreme Court held:

While exact conformance with the precise terms
of the termination procedures is doubtless the
least controversial course, so long as the
substantial interests those procedures are
designed to safeguard are in fact satisfied and
protected, failure to conform to every technical
detail of the termination procedure is not
actionable. Piacitelli, 636 P.2d at 1067.
As in the Piacitelli case, S.L.C.A.P.'s policy manual
provides for progressive disciplinary steps, culminating
in termination.

It also provides for yearly written

evaluations to be used, in part, for consideration in
these disciplinary steps.
P-l.

Schultz Deposition at 9 & Ex.

For instance, disciplinary action for incompetency

or inefficiency should be evidenced by at least two
consecutive performance evaluations.

Ij3. The Manual does

not contain any statement of this policy's purpose.
However, such policies are generally designed to provide
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of March, 1977, he was notified that he was going to be
terminated.

I_d. at 104.

These undisputed facts show that the Executive
Director met with Gilmore on numerous occasions about the
problems with his work.

Gilmore was well advised during

his employment of the Executive Director's evaluation of
his performance, even though the evaluations were not
written.

As in the Piacitelli case, the Executive

Director notified Gilmore in these numerous oral
interviews of his unacceptable conduct, the deficiencies
in his performance, and that his job was in jeopardy.
These notifications occurred long before his termination.
As a result, the purposes for which the policy was
established were satisfied.

Gilmore was granted

substantial early warning of his deficiencies and of the
consequences thereof if the deficiencies persisted.
Therefore, S.L.C.A.P.'s method in terminating Gilmore
substantially complied with the policy manual.
While Gilmore's job performance was

deficient, this

was not the primary reason for his termination.
was actually reduced in force.

Gilmore

When it became apparent

early in 1976 that Gilmore was having difficulty, federal
officials also reported that S.L.C.A.P.'s accounting
systems and procedures were cumbersome and outdated.
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Schultz Deposition at 99-100.

In May or June, 1976, the

decision was made to computerize Gilmore's department,
Gilmore Deposition at 86 & 89.

However, Gilmore held no

computer skills, ^d. at 28. Despite this drawback, on
December 15, 1976, the Executive Director proposed a plan
to the Board of Directors in which Gilmore would,
nevertheless, remain as an Office Manager.
turned this plan down.

The Board

Schultz Deposition at 128. As a

result, the Executive Director completely reorganized
Gilmore1s department by hiring an accounting supervisor
with computer accounting background, directing a computer
specialist to establish all of S.L.C.A.P.'s accounts on
the computer and having the Executive Director assume all
of the policy type functions of Gilmore1s position.

Id.

at 129-130. This eliminated Gilmore's position resulting
in his reduction in force.

Ld.

The Executive Director

believed that Gilmore needed unemployment compensation and
needed to find other employment.

Therefore, he cited only

this primary reason, reduction in force, as the reason for
termination.

16. at 131.

The procedures and policies pertaining to a reduction
in force are set forth at Chapter VII, Section B of the
Manual as follows:
-35-

When it becomes necessary because of funding or
budgetary limitations to terminate, reassign,
transfer, or demote an employee, the Executive
Director shall take such action based upon
employee seniority, performance, skills,
abilities and importance of position. All
employees reassigned, terminated, transferred,
or demoted shall be give fifteen (15) days of
written notice, said notice specifying the
reasons which dictated the actions of the
Executive Director.
Schultz Deposition at 9 & Ex. P-l.

This policy only

applies when funding or budgetary limitations necessitate
termination.

As shown in the preceding paragraph, Gilmore

was reduced in force because the computerization of his
department eliminated his position.

The manual does not

provide for any policies or procedures in this
circumstance.

Instead, the Executive Director has

authority to reduce in force employees as deemed
appropriate.

R. at 151; Philbrick Deposition at 15. As a

result, S.L.C.A.P. was not in violation of any specific
policy or procedure for reducing Gilmore in force due to
the elimination of his position.
The manual does provide, however, that employees are
entitled to fifteen days advance written notice of
termination.

Schultz Deposition at 9 & Ex. P-l.

This

procedure or policy is generally designed to provide the
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employee an opportunity to begin securing new employment,
thereby lessening the effects of unemployment.

The first

part of March, 1977, the Executive Director orally
notified Gilmore that he was going to be terminated.
Gilmore Deposition, at 104. On March 14, 1977, he was
notified of his termination in writing.

R. at 4 & 82. In

the written notice, the Executive Director did not make
the termination effective until four days later, March 18,
1977.

Gilmore then received two weeks pay in lieu of

advance written notice, effective March 18. Gilmore
Deposition at Ex. D-15.
These undisputed facts establish that Gilmore was
orally notified, about two weeks prior to the effective
date, that he would be terminated.
days advance written notice.

He was also given four

Then he was paid for two

weeks beginning March 18, 1977, without having to report
to work.

This allowed Gilmore fifteen days of free time,

with pay, to find new employment.

If S.L.C.A.P. had

strictly complied with the fifteen day advance written
notice procedure Gilmore would not have enjoyed this free
time with pay.

As a result, the procedure S.L.C.A.P. used

provided Gilmore with more opportunity to find new
employment and lessen the effects of possible unemployment
than the procedure in the policy manual.
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In other words,

the interests or reasons for this policy and procedure
were certainly not compromised; rather, they were
advanced.

Hence, S.L.C.A.P., at the very least,

substantially complied with the manual in this respect.
The manual also provides that the notice of
termination shall specify the reasons therefor,
Deposition at 9 & Ex, P-l.

Schultz

As shown above, prior to

termination Gilmore was well aware that his department was
being computerized.

He knew he held no computer skills.

He was present at the meeting when the Executive Director
proposed a plan to nevertheless retain Gilmore, which was
turned down.

He was handed his Separation Notice which

cited the reason for termination as a reduction in force.
R. at 4, 54 & 84.

His written notice of termination

explained that his position was eliminated.
Deposition at Vol. II, p. 9 & Ex. D-15.

Gilmore

As is also shown

above, the Executive Director met with Gilmore on numerous
occasions regarding the problem with his work.

Gilmore

knew that his job was in jeopardy because of these
problems.

As a result, Gilmore was well advised and

provided numerous notice of the reasons for terminating
his employment.

Hence, S.L.C.A.P. was in substantial

compliance with this policy as well.
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B. S.L.C.A.P. Complied With The Policy Manual In
Hearing Gilmore's Appeal.
S.L.C.A.P.fs appeal procedure was adopted to provide
for prompt and fair consideration of personnel actions.
Schultz Deposition at 9 & Ex. P-l.

Gilmore complains that

he was not afforded prompt and fair consideration.
Specifically, he complains that he was not afforded a
"formal hearing", was not given the right to confront or
cross-examine the Executive Director, was never advised of
the evidence presented against him, was not given the
opportunity to rebut or respond to the evidence against
him, and the literal or strict appeal procedures were
violated.

In other words, Gilmore believes that he was

not afforded a fair hearing because it was not a trial
type or formal hearing.

However, due process, or

fairness and justice, does not require a trial type
hearing in every case.

Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers

v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed. 2d
1230 (1961).
In Robinson v. Wichita Falls and North Texas
Community Action Program, 507 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1975), an
employee falsely accused another employee of
misappropriating funds.

The employee appealed the

decision to terminate him.

The grievance committee's

-39-

review was made on the basis of written statements,
without personal appearance, formal presentations of
evidence and argument, confrontation or cross examination,
or any other formal or trial type characteristic.

The

United States Fifth Circuit Court held that a trial type
hearing was not required.

The rights afforded the

employee by the fairness requirements of due process were
satisfied by the Community Action's procedure.

Also see

Kelly v. Action for Boston Community Development, Inc.,
419 F.Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1976), and Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed. 2d 712 (1975).
The manner in which S.L.C.A.P. reviewed Gilmore's
termination was substantially similar to the review
afforded the employee in the Robinson v. Wichita Falls and
North Texas Community Action Program case.

The appeal

procedure consists of two levels of review.

The first

level is to the Executive Director.
9 & Ex. P-l.

Schultz Deposition at

He notified Gilmore the first part of March,

1977, of the decision to terminate him.

One to three days

later Gilmore arranged a meeting with the Executive
Director to prevail upon him to change his mind.

GiJmore

Deposition at 108.

The meeting was held in the Executive

Directors office.

It lasted the better part of an hour.

Id. at Vol. II, p. 16.

Gilmore admits that in this
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meeting he was given every opportunity to demonstrate why
he should not be terminated.

I^d. at Vol. II, p. 6 & 17.

He describes the meeting as a series of refutations
between the Executive Director and himself.
109-115.

Jd.

at

The Executive Director did not change his mind.

The second level of review is to the Personnel
Committee.

Schultz Deposition at 9 & Ex. P-l.

was scheduled for March 16, 1977. R. at 7.

A hearing

At the

beginning of the meeting the Committee explained the
hearing format to Gilmore.

Gilmore was to make his

statement before the Committee on a tape recorder.

He

would then be excused and the Executive Director would be
called in to do the same.
p. 29-31.

Gilmore Deposition at Vol. II,

The Committee also explained that there would

not be sufficient time to conclude the hearing that day,
so it would be continued to the next week.
had no objection.

Td.

Gilmore

Icl. The reason for this format was to

afford Gilmore the right to speak his mind and present all
the evidence he had outside of his immediate supervisor's,
the Executive Director, presence.

The Committee believed

that this was more fair for Gilmore.
29.

Geter Deposition at

The hearing was then conducted according to this

format.

Gilmore admits that the Committee did not refuse

any of the evidence he offered.
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Gilmore Deposition at

Vol. II, p. 33.

Both Gilmore and the Executive Director

wrote statements to the Committee supporting their
positions.

16. at 42-48.

rights as was S.L.C.A.P.

Gilmore was afforded the same
Geter Deposition at 13. The

Committee's chairman testified that the Committee was not
biased against Gilmore but was fair in its hearing of
Gilmorefs appeal.

]j3.

evidence presented.

T

^ e decision was based on the

3x1. at 27.

Just as in the Robinson v. Wichita Falls and North
Texas Community Action Program case, a formal hearing was
not necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process.
The procedures used at both appeal levels were fair and
prompt.

Gilmore was given notice of the hearing.

He was

afforded the right to be present and he presented all the
evidence he desired.

He was afforded the right to submit

a written statement in addition to his testimony.

His

case was heard by three impartial members of the
Committee.

As a result, the purposes for which the appeal

procedure was adopted were ful]y satisfied.
Moreover, Gilmore never requested the formal
procedures he now claims should have been provided.

The

Committee never refused to allow Gilmore to do something
he requested to do.

Gilmore Deposition at Vol. Ti, p. 33.

He never objected to the format of the hearing.
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16. at

Vol. II, p. 32.

He never requested the Executive

Director's presence.

Id.

at Vol. II, p. 29.

He never

requested that he be allowed to confront or cross-examine
the Director at any time.

Id.

He never requested the

right to challenge or disqualify any member of the
Committee.

R. at 575 & 581.

He never requested that the

Committee's decision be based solely on the evidence
o

adduced at the hearing.

1^3.

He never requested a
9
written decision from the Committee. Ld. He never
requested a verbatim record.
waived these rights.

_Id*

As

a

result, he

Singer v. United States, 380 U.S.

24, 13 L.Ed. 2d 630, 86 S.Ct. 783 (1965); Eliason v.
Wilborn, 281 U.S. 457, 74 L.Ed. 962, 50 S.Ct. 382 (1930).
Pierce v. Somerset R. Co., 171 U.S. 641, 43 L.Ed. 316, 19
S.Ct. 64 (1898); Doty v. Love, 295 U.S. 64, 79 L. Ed.
1303, 55 S. Ct. 558 (1935) .
In addition, the procedures used in hearing Gilmore's
appeal substantially complied with the personnel policies
manual.

The manual provides that the Executive Director

provide employees a hearing within seven days of the
notice of appeal.

Schultz Deposition at 9 & Ex. P-l.

reasons for this type of procedure are to afford the
employee an opportunity to change the decision, Lo give

I9IdId.
10—•
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The

his side of the story, to be fully informed of the reasons
for termination, and allow the person or body hearing the
appeal an opportunity to review the decision.

Within four

or five days after the Executive Director notified Gilmore
of the decision to terminate him, he was afforded a full
hearing.

Gilmore was granted every opportunity at this

hearing to change the Executive Director's mind.

The

Executive Director heard all of the evidence, reviewed it
and upheld his decision.

As a result, this appeal policy

was fully satisfied.
The manual then provides that an appeal may be taken
to the personnel committee.

Jd.

The Committee is

responsible to provide a hearing within seven days of the
notice of appeal.

I_d. Within five days after concluding

the hearing the Committee is then responsible to prepare
and submit its findings. ^Id*

The

reason for this type

of procedure is to insure that the procedures below were
administered fairly and not arbitrarily, capriciously or
discriminatively.

Gilmore was afforded his hearing before

the Personnel Committee within seven days after notice of
his appeal.

It was held on March 16, 1977, and finished

on March 21, 1977. The Committee consists of thrpe
members and it was heard by all three.
156.

R. at 7, 56, 150 &

Gilmore had every opportunity to present all his
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evidence and argument.
April 1, 1971,

Gilmore Deposition at 158. On

the Personnel Committee Chairman advised

Gilmore that the Committee was not able to make
arrangements to meet for the final decision.

R. at 8.

The Chairman also told him that the reason they could not
reach the decision within five days was due to the many
pieces of evidence and the legal ramifications.

Gilmore

Deposition at 166. Gilmore did not object, nor did he
insist that the Committee render the decision in five days
despite this notification.

_Id. at 166-167. On April

13,1977, the Committee rendered its finding supporting the
Executive Director's decision to terminate Gilmore.

Id.

at 5-6 & Ex. D-14. Again, this procedure substantially
complied with the manual.

Gilmore was afforded a prompt,

fair hearing and the policies of review were fully
satisfied.
POINT III

SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING GILMORE1S CLAIMS
AGAINST THE EMPLOYEES AND OFFICERS OF
S.L.C.A.P. IS PROPER BECAUSE THESE INDIVIDUAL
DEFENDANTS ARE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR ANY
PURPORTED BREACH OF CONTRACT.

The well established rule of law is that individual
employees and officers of a corporation, who act within
the course and scope of their employment, act under a
privilege and cannot be held individually liable for the
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corporation's breach of contract.

Wise v. Southern

Pacific Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 35 Cal. Rptr. 659
(1953), afffd on other grounds, 1 Cal. 3d 600, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 202 (1970).

Also see Golden v. Anderson, 256 Cal.

App. 2d 714, 64 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1967).
In the Wise case the plaintiff sued his former
employer for wrongful discharge and also sued his former
co-employees for conspiracy to obtain his discharge.

The

Court of Appeal upheld demurrers to the complaint as to
the individual defendants and stated:
Agents and employees of a corporation cannot
conspire with their corporate principal or
employer where they act in their official
capacities on behalf of the corporation and not
as individuals for their individual advantage.
[Citations omitted.] This rule derives from the
principle that ordinarily corporate agents and
employees acting for and on behalf of the
corporation cannot be held liable for inducing a
breach of the corporation's contract since being
in a confidential relationship to the
corporation their action in this respect is
privileged. The inducement of the breach to be
actionable must be both wrongful and
unprivileged. (Citations omitted; emphasis
added.) Wise, 223 Cal App. 2d at 72-73.
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In Gilmore's claim for breach of contract he has not
made any allegation that the employees and officers,
individually named in this suit, acted beyond the scope of
their employment.

The undisputed facts show clearly that

these individuals acted only in the course of their
employment, for and on behalf of S.L.C.A.P.

Therefore,

their actions were privileged and they cannot be held
personally liable for any purported breach of the
employment contract.

Because Gilmore has not alleged that

these individual defendants acted other than in the course
and scope of their employment, nor set forth any facts
showing otherwise, the trial Court's summary dismissal of
his breach of contract claims against the individual
defendants is proper.
CONCLUSION
Respondents seek the following relief:
1.

An affirmance of the lower Court's summary

judgment dismissing Gilmore's breach of contract claims
against all Respondents,

with prejudice, and an award of

Respondent's costs pursuant to Rule 34, R. Utah Ct. App.

-47-

2.

In the alternative, affirmance of the lower

Court's summary judgment dismissing the breach of contract
claims against the Respondents Hal J. Schultz, Robert E.
Philbrick, Fred Geter, Richard Fields and Ann O'Connell,
and an award of their costs, pursuant to Rule 34, R. Utah
Ct. App.
DATED t h i s

£<^

day of

JOUU/K.

fisJ(MJLL6LM

u 6Ls
RICE

Attorney for Respondents

STEPHEN W. COOK
Attorney for Respondents
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on the ^ ^

day of February,

1988, I mailed, postage prepaid, four copies of the Brief
of Respondents together with a copy of this Certificate of
Service to the following:
Nann
Mark
4348
Salt

Novinski-Durando and
S. Miner
South Jupiter Drive
Lake City, Utah 84124

JOFWK. RICE
A t t o r n e y for Defendants/Respondents

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
oooOooo
WALTER K. GILMORE,
Plaintiff,
v.
SALT LAKE AREA COMMUNITY
ACTION PROGRAM, a Utah corporation; HAL J. SCHULTZ,
Executive Director; ROBERT E.
PHILBRICK, Presxdent, Board
of Trustees; FRED GETER,
Chairman, Personnel Committee;
ANN OlCONNELL, TERRY WILLIAMS,
JOHN E, DELANEY, TED L.
WILSON, JENNINGS PHILLIPS,
GLEN GREENER, PETE KUTULAS,
WILLIAM DUNN, RALPH McCLURE,
JESS AGRAZ, DON MIERVA, LUCY
OTERO, GLEN M. LARSEN, BERNICE
BENNS, LAMBERTUS JENSEN,
SOLOMON CHACON, LEON REESE,
PALMER DEPAULIS, RICHARD LIGH,
VICTOR DELGADO, NORBEST
MARTINEZ, MAVIS LINDSAY,
M. C. EBERHARDT, CLEMENT JAY,
EV/ MAEZ, JERRI BROWN, WAYNE
HORROCKS, MERNOINE JEX, ROBERT
MACRI, constituting the Board
of Trustees of the Salt Lake
Area Community Action Program,
their officers, employees,
successors and assigns,

DEFENDANTS' FIRST REQUESTS
FOR ADMISSIONS

Civil No. ^-7f-0^^r

Defendants.
oooOooo
The Defendants by and through their undersigned counsLi
Stephen

V. Cook, pursuant

to Rules

36 and 37(c) of the Tederal

Rules of Civil Procedure, herewith serve upon the Plaintiff tht
following requests for admissions for response within thirty (30;
days.

Each request shall be deemed by the Defendants as admitted

unless, within th^t-v (30) davs after service of the requests, the
Plaintiff serves upon the Defendants a written answer or an appr
priate objectioa addressed to the request signed by the Plainlifl
or his attorney. 'The defendants provide notice of their intent •

Addendum 1

pursue reasonable expenses including attorney's fees in provii.
any request inappropriately denied.

All requests are directed

to the period of April 1, 1976 to April 1, 1977.
-REQUEST NO. 1: The Salt Lake Community Action Program has no power to
impose governmental sanctions, either civil or criminal in nature,
upon any citizen of the State of Utah or any subdivision thereof.
REQUEST NO. 2:

The Salt Lake Area Community Action Prograiv

has no power to impose governmental sanctions, either civil or
criminal in nature, "upon any citizen of the United States of Amc: ica or any subdivision thereof.
REQUEST NO. 3:

The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program

has nb power to impose taxes, levy fines or assessments, or other
governmental fees upon the citizens of the State of Utah and its
subdivisions' or upon the citizens of the United States and its
subdivisions.
REQUEST NO. A:

The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program

does not enjoy free mailing privileges or has postage paid by th/
Utah State or United States Government.
REQUEST NO. 5:

The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program

has no vested regulatory authority to regulate the conduct or
affairs of non-employee citizens of the State of Utah or any of
its political subdivisions.
REQUEST NO. 6:

The Salt Lake Area Community Action Progra..

has no vested regulatory authority to regulate the conduct cu
affairs*of non-employee citizens of the United States or a^y
its political subdivisions.
REQUEST NO. 7:

None \f f.he Defendants are agencres crc i? -'

mentalities of the State of Utah or its political subdi"., , f>-:
REQUEST NO. 8:
S u i t e d Stat*. •
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Addendum 2

•-. •• ••. ' .."?

REQUEST NO. 10: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program has no power or right to publish rules and regulations in
the Federal Register.
REQUEST NO. 11: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program
has no power or right to publish rules and regulations in the
State of Utah Bulletin published by the Department of Finance, Utah
State Archives & Records Service.
REQUEST NO 12: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program
has no power or right to the use of equipment, facilities, or
supplies provided by the General Services Administration.
REQUEST NO. 13:

The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program

has np power or right to the use of equipment, facilities, or
supplies owned by the State of Utah or any of its political subdivisions .
REQUEST NO. 14: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program
does not have any powers of condemnation.
REQUEST NO. 15:

The Salt Lake Area Community Action Prograi

has no authority to deposit and withdraw money from the monetary
depositories of the Utah State or Federal Governments.
REQUEST NO. 16:

The Salt Lake Area Community Action Program

employees are not employed and subject to any municipal, county
or state merit systems'.
REQUEST NO. 17: The employees of the Salt Lake Area Commun;t\
Action Program are not employees of, nor paid by, the State of Ui.»
or its political subdivisions.
REQUEST NO. 18:

The Community Services Administration does

not operate as a federal agency on a local level and does not
supervise the daily operation of a community action agency.
REQUEST 'NO. 19: * The State of Utah and its political subdivisions have •

, .t or power over the daily personnel decis-

ions-p£ the Salt Lake Area Community Action Program.
REQUEST NO. 20: The State of Utah and its political subdivisions does not supervise or participate in the daily personnLI
decisions of the Salt Lake Area Community Action Program.
Addendum 3

REQUEST NO. 21: There are no rules or regulations of the
Community Services Administration that authorizes the CommuniLy
Services Administration to supervise or participate in the daily
personnel decisions of the Salt Lake Area Community Action Prograr
REQUEST NO. 22: The Community Services Administration has
neither interpreted nor defined the phrase "fair consideration"
in CSA instruction 6900-01(c)5.
REQUEST NO. 23: The relationship of the Community Services
Administration to the Salt Lake Area Community Action Program
is in the nature of a grantor-grantee/contractor-contractee
relationship.
REQUEST NO. 24: The Community Services Administration has
no authority to require the Salt Lake Area Community Action Program
to hire or fire particular employees or take other specific personnel actions.
REQUEST NO. 25: The Salt Lake Area Community Action Progran
l

is a private non profit corporation organized under Section 16-6-lC
et. seq. U.C.A. (1953), as amended, entitled "Utah Nonprofit
Corporation and Cooperative Association Act".
REQUEST NO. 26: Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of employment and the completion of all grievance procedures provided
by the Defendants' personnel policies, the Plaintiff never requested information relating to hearing procedures and format, including rules governing the admissibility of evidence.
REQUEST NO. 27: Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of employment and the completion of all grievance procedures provided
by the Defendants' personnel policies, the Plaintiff never requested to be represented by counsel or by an appropriate counsel
substitute.
REQUEST NO

,

Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of em-

piloymeti^ -and the completion of all grievance procedures provided
by the Defendants.1 personnel policies, the Plaintiff never requeM
to confront or cross-examine witnesses or accusors.
-4-

Addendum 4

REQUEST NO. 29:

Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of en

ployment and the completion of all grievance procedures provideu
by the Defendants' personnel policies, the Plaintiff never requester
any right to challenge and disqualify members of the hearing bod>
nor did he challenge or attempt to disqualify members of the
hearing body.
REQUEST NO. 30: Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of employment and the completion of all grievance procedures provided
by the Defendants' personnel policies, the Plaintiff never requests
any right to have the decision of the hearing body based solely
upon evidence adduced at the hearing.
REQUEST NO. 31: Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of employment and the completion of all grievance procedures provided
by the Defendants' personnel policies, the Plaintiff never requestc
the right to have a written decision of the hearing body stating
the reasons for their decision and the evidence adduced at the
hearing upon which the decision was based.
REQUEST NO. 32: Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of employment and the completion of all grievance procedures provided
by the Defendants; personnel policies, the Plaintiff never request"
the right to have a verbatim record of the hearing made and exhibits retained.
REQUEST NO. 33: The Plaintiff had no individual written employment contract that specified any definite period of time for
employment with the Defendants.
REQUEST NO. 34: The Plaintiff was terminated for cause froi.»
the Assistance Payments Division on April 14, 1979.
REQUEST NO. 35: During 1977, 1978, and 1979, there were jol^
m bookkeeping, accounting, and accounting collection with pnvi c
employers in tin

i paying between $500.00 and $700.00 a month,
I
that tt^e Plaintiff-could have obtained had he applied.
REQUEST NO. 36:

No employer has refused to employ the Plain-

tiff because of the Plaintiff's prior employment service with
-5Addendum 5

the Defendants.
REQUEST NO. 37: The Defendants' sole stated reason for the
Plaintiff's termination of employment was "Reduction in Force."
• REQUEST NO. 38: At the time of the Plaintiff's termination
of employment, the fiscal department of the Defendants was reorganized:

by, inter alia, the position of Fiscal Director was ab-

olished; the assumption of the Fiscal Director's responsibilities
by the Executive Director, Hal J. Schultz; and the hiring of an
accounting supervisor, Gary Pararra, who had training in computor
programming and accounting.
REQUEST NO. 39: For the fiscal year ending September 30,
1977, the State of Utah and its political subdivisions never ap*
propr^ated funds (as opposed to donations and specific contracts)
for the administration of the Salt Lake Area Community Action Program.
REQUEST NO. 40: For the fiscal year ending September 30,
1977, tlje percentage of total income received by the Salt Lake Are.1
Community Action Program from the State of Utah and its political
subdivisions for specific contracts was 7.27o ($145,000.00 divided
by $2,026,000.00).
REQUEST NO. 41: For the fiscal year ending September 30,
1977, the percentage of total income received by the Salt Lake
Area Community Action Program from the State of Utah and its political subdivisions for donations was 3.57o ($70,068.00 divided
by $2,026,000.00).
REQUEST NO. 42: For the fiscal year ending September 30,
1977, all income received by the Salt Lake Area Community Action
Program from the Federal Government was for specific contracts
or grants with the Federal Government.
REQUEST NO. 43: * The Plaintiff was afforded the right to
submit; a griev.t

.aer Chapter IX, Section A, of the Defendants'
i

Perponnjel- Policies'and the Plaintiff did so submit a grievance.
REQUEST NO. 44; The Plaintiff was afforded the right to
have his grievance referred to the Personnel Administration undui
Chapter IX, Section A, of the Defendants' Personnel Policies.
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REQUEST HO. 45: The Plaintiff was afforded the right to re-,
his grievance to the Executive Director under Chapter IX, Sectiou
A, of the Defendants' Personnel Policies and the Plaintiff did so
by letter dated March 15, 1977.
REQUEST NO. 46:

The Plaintiff was afforded the right to ap-

peal his grievance to the Executive Director under Chapter IX,
Section B, of the Defendants' Personnel Policies and he did so
appeal to the Executive Director by letter dated March 15, 197 7.
REQUEST NO. 47:

The Executive Director considered the-Plain-

tiff's referral/appeal and notified the Plaintiff by letter dated
March 16, 1977, of such consideration.
REQUEST NO. 48: The Plaintiff was afforded the right to appea
his grievance to the Personnel Committee of the Board of Trustee^
under Chapter IX, Section B, of the Defendants' Personnel Policies
and he did so appeal to the Personnel Committee of the Board of
Trustees.
I
REQUEST NO. 49:

The Plaintiff was afforded a hearing within

seven (7) days from his notice of appeal to the Personnel CommitIII
under Chapter IX, Section B, of the Defendants' Personnel Policies
REQUEST NO. 50: The Plaintiff was provided the right and
opportunity to present any witnesses or evidence he desired in
his behalf under Chapter IX, Section B, of the Defendants' Personnel Policies.
REQUEST NO. 51: Within five (5) days of the hearing of the
Eersonnal Committee, the Personnel Committee notified the Plaintifi
in writing that they required more time to deliberate and the Plc'^i
tiff did not object to this procedure.
REQUEST NO. 52:

On April 13, 1977, the Plaintiff was notif-

ied in writing by the' Personnel Committee of its findings under
Chapter IX, Sett. f i>, of the Defendants' Personnel Policies.
•

r

jBEQUEST NO. 53: The Plaintiff was afforded all grievence
and appeal rights.and opportunities set forth in Chapter IX of
-7-
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the Defendants' Personnel Policies.
REQUEST MO. 54: The Plaintiff received pay for two weeks
fie did not work following his termination of employment from the
Defendants.
REQUEST NO. 55:

The Plaintiff was not terminated because of

any exercise of his constitutional rights.
REQUEST NO. 56: Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of employment and the completion of all grievance procedures provided
by the Defendants' Personnel Policies, the Plaintiff never complained about (A) the hearing procedures and format, including
the rules governing the admissibility of evidence; (B) not having
counsel or an appropriate counsel substitute; (C) any lack of
confrontation or cross-examination of witnesses or accusors; (D)
the composition of the hearing body; (E) the decision of the Personnel Committee being based upon the evidence adduced at the
hearing; and (F) not having a verbatim record of the hearing made
and exhibits retained.
REQUEST NO. 57: Prior to the Plaintiff's termination of employment, the Salt Lake Area Community Action Program received no
income or training and technical advice from the Utah State Economic Opportunity Office.
REQUEST NO. 58: There are no procedures or practices whereb)
an employee has a right of appeal from personnel decisions of the
Salt Lake Area Community Action Program to the State of Utah or i'
political subdivisions or to the federal government.
REQUEST. NO. 59:

The Plaintiff's grievance was provided pro:,

consideration by the Defendants.
• REQUEST NO. 60: The Personnel Committee, individually and
collectively, was not* biased or prejudiced against the Plaintiff.
'IfrEQUEST NO.

t

The Utah State Economic Opportunity Office

s .an .organization'-separate and distinct from the Salt Lake Area

h

Community Action and has no regulatory authority over the Salt
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Lake Area Community Action Program.
DATED this

%Q

day of February, 1980.

•J <2u

STEPHEN W. COOK
Attorney for'Defendants
L1TTLEFIELD, COOK 6c PETERSON
426 South Fifth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435

Mailed a copy of the foregoing Defendants1 First Requests
for Admissions, to Kathryn Collard, Attorney at Law, Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, this

day of February, 1$80,

postage prepaid.
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KATHRYN COLLARD
Attorney for Plaintiff
COLLARD, KUHNHAUSEN, PIXTON & DOWNES
Ten Exchange Place, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-1663
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

PLAINTIFF"S ANSWERS TO
DEFENDANT'S FIRST REQUEST
FOR ADMISSIONS

WALTER K. GILMORE,
Plaintiff,
-vSALT LAKE AREA COMMUNITY
ACTION PROGRAM, et al.,

Civil No. C-78-0258

Defendants.
Plaintiff, WALTER K. GILMORE, by and through his
attorney, KATHRYN COLLARD, hereby submits his Answers to
Defendant's First Request for Admissions, in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Request No. 1:

Admit.

%:

Admit.

Request No. 3j^

Admit.

Request No

Request No. ;i; Admit.
Request No. 5:

Deny.

Request No. 6:

Deny.

Request No. 7:

Deny.

Request No. 8:

Deny.

Request No. 9:

Admit.

Request No. 10?

Admit.

Request No._ 113 Admit.
Request No. 12:

Deny.

Request No. 13:

Deny.

Request No.,l4<

Admit.

Request No. 15:

Deny.

Request No. v 16;

Admit.
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Request No. 17:

Deny.

Request No. 18:

Deny.

Request No. 19:

Deny.

Request No. 20:

Deny.

Request No. 21:

Deny.

Request No'. 22:

Deny.

Request No. 23;

Admit.

Request No. 24:

Deny.

Request No.. 25 \

Admit.

Request No. 26:

Deny,

Request No. 27:

Deny.

Request No. 28:

Deny.

Request Ko._ (Z9 >

k&iftit.

Request No. 30

Admit.

Request NO. jl'

Admit.

Request No. 32:

Admit.

Request No. .33;

Admit.

Request No. 34:

Deny.

Request No. 35:

Plaintiff objects to this request

for admission upon the ground that it requires Plaintiff to
speculate about facts and occurrences about which he has
no personal knowledge.
Request No. 36:

Plaintiff has no information

upon which to admit or deny this request for admission and
accordingly denies the same.
Request No. 37:

Deny.

Request No. 38:

Deny.

Request No. 39:

Deny.

Request No. 40:

Deny.

Request No. 41:

Deny.

Request No. 4 2»

Admit.

Request No. 43:

Plaintiff admits that he filed

a grievance but denies that the grievance was filed pursuant
to Section A of Chapter IX of the Defendants1 Personnel
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Policies.
Request No.

44:

Deny.

Request No.

45:

Deny.

Request No.

46:

Deny.

Request No.

47:

Deny.

Request NQ.

48:

Deny,

49 ?

Admit.

Request No.

50:

Deny.

Request No.

51:

Deny.

Request No.

52:

Deny.

Request No.

53:

Deny.

Request No.

i

Request No. 54/

Admit.

Request No. 55;

Admit

Request No. 56:

Deny.

Request No. 57:

Deny.

Request No. 58:

Deny.

Request No. 59:

Deny.

5 t: S 3

Request No. 60:

Deny.

W 3

Request No..61:

Admit.

a

z

o
ft
N £
* 3

< 5| S

<

DATED this

2./

day of March, 1980,

O

u

?/fc^

'"&£__-«

W A L T E R K. GILMORE
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

: ss.
)

WALTER K. GILMORE, being first duly sworn upon
his oath, deposes and states that he is the Plaintiff in
the above referenced action; that he has read the foregoing
Answers to Defendant's First Request for Admission; that
the answers thereto are true and correct to the best of
his knowledge, information and belief.
DATED this

'ZJ

day of March, 1980.

~?/<SSr.S< ^4;

;>>-#-/<*

W A L T E R K. GILMORE
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this ±1 /
of March, 1980.
. )».Y COV.V.I:$»O:J trp;nts c c ::>

"Ti7/u Jjtaotto /-

day
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this 20th day of March,
1980, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiffvs Answers To Defendants First Request For Admissions, to
Stephen W, Cookf Attorney for Defendants, to his office at
426 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, UtahJ 84102, by depositing
the same in the U,S, Mail, postage prepaid.

SlOwl

M/A^^t
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